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The objective of the paper is to show that the recovery from the current economic 
crisis in US and in EU requires a new policy paradigm and a new global governance. I 
argue  that,  contrary  to  the  recent  austerity  policies  in  EU  and  US,  a  new  level  of 
government involvement is required in order to keep aggregate demand stable, make full 
employment possible, and create a transparent financial sector, serving the real economy 
and encouraging productive investments. Moreover, at global level, two main issues seem 
to affect negatively the markets: first the lack of an independent international currency, 
and second the instability of one of the biggest market, the Eurozone.  The first needs a 
wider international solution, the latter needs a political responses at EU level in order to 
deepen integration. 
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“Yes, there have been differences between America and Europe. No 
doubt, there will be differences in the future. But the burdens of a 




The  economic  crisis  of  2007-2009  is  still  displaying  its  effects  in  terms  of 
unemployment, slow economic recovery, lack of job creation and debt issues. The US 
and the EU are the most affected by these effects. Mass unemployment, sovereign debt 
crises and Current Account deficits, financial market volatility, are badly undermining 
US  and  EU  recoveries.  Prospect  of  economic  growth  are  very  low  and  a  crisis  of 
confidence seems to affect negatively their levels of investment. Such a scenario suggests 
a  declining  trend  for  the  most  advanced  economies  in  the  world  and  a  declining 
hegemony  for  the  US  (Clelland  and  Dunaway  2010).  On  the  contrary  emerging 
economies and in particular China and BRIC grow consistently and seem already far 
away from the 2007-2009 crisis, which however did not affect them so badly as the EU 
and the US. 
The objective of the paper is to show that the recovery from the crisis requires a 
new policy paradigm and a new global governance. The root of this crisis in the EU and 
in the US are strictly endogenous to their economic systems, and concerns in particular 
the specific path that these two economies embarked since the end of 1970s (as regards 
the  US)  and  since  the  beginning  of  1990s  (as  regards  the  EU).  Such  a  path  caused 
extreme  financialization  in  the  US  and  in  the  EU,  profits  soar  and  wages  stagnation 
(Wolff,  2010;  EuroMemorandum  2010;  Ivanova  2010;  Posner,  2009).  The  idea  of  a 
minimalist  state,  which  was  coupled  with  a  financial  system  completely  deregulated, 
financial activities, portfolio investments, and speculation free to float around the globe, 
has  been  the  main  theoretical  paradigm  for  the  past  30  years  (Petit,  2009).  Such  a 
paradigm, eventually, created bubbles and global Ponzi schemes in the financial markets, 
which inevitably burst in 2007-08 (Rasmus, 2010). In the real markets this paradigm 
created lack of productive investments in particular after the burst of the dot-com bubble 
(in  2001)  in  the  West  (mainly  US  and  some  EU  countries),  saving  glut,  and  global 
                                                 
2 Presidential Nominee Barack Obama in Berlin speech “A World that Stands as One” July 24, 2008. URL 
(July 27, 2008): http://my.barackobama.com/page/content/berlinvideo      6 
imbalances, characterized by huge deficit in the Western economies and surplus in Asia 
(mainly China) and few other emerging economies (Ostefeld and Rogoff, 2009).   
I argue that, contrary to the recent austerity policies in EU and US, a new level of 
government involvement is required in order to keep aggregate demand stable, make full 
employment possible, and create a transparent financial sector, serving the real economy 
and encouraging productive investments. Moreover, at global level, two main issues seem 
to affect negatively the markets: first the lack of an independent international currency, 
and second the instability of one of the biggest global markets, the Eurozone.  The first 
needs a wider international solution, the latter needs a political response at EU level in 
order to deepen integration. 
The Governor of the Chinese People’s Bank, Zhou Xiaochuan, has already argued 
against the use of the US dollar, and he has blamed its supremacy as reserve currency for 
the  current  imbalances  and  crisis.  Zhou  Xiaochuan  seems  to  recommend  the  old 
Keynesian  proposal  of  1944  at  Bretton  Woods;  with  a  global  currency,  the  bancor, 
managed by an International Bank (the International Clearing Union) which would serve 
as the regulating institution of global surpluses and deficits. Zhou Xiaochuan (2009: 1) 
claims that, “The outbreak of the crisis and its spillover to the entire world reflect the 
inherent vulnerabilities and systemic risks in the existing international monetary system.”  
The unique status of the US dollar underlines a latent political conflict and the need to 
revise a system of global financial governance which emerged immediately after WWII, 
when international politics and economics looked very different than now (Fuchita and 
Litan 2007).  
In this context of reshaping international governance, EU and US relations seem 
to be stronger, although macroeconomic cooperation still remains limited. From one side 
politics, in the post-Bush scenario, is showing more interest for multilateralism
3, from 
another side, domestic constraints during crisis time prove to be tied. Nevertheless, a new 
                                                 
3 “The time has come to start thinking of an Atlantic Agenda for Globalization. We have the transatlantic 
marketplace, NATO, the Transatlantic Economic Council, and other instruments that we should continue to 
leverage for maximum mutual benefit. But we should move beyond this and set an agenda of common 
action for a new multilateralism that can benefit the whole world.” European Commission President Jose 
Manuel Barroso, September 24, 2008. URL (March 4, 2009): 
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=55&Itemid=43   
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geopolitical order is emerging and, as called for by international consensus within the 
United  Nations  or  among  emerging  economies,  G20  countries,  and  oil-producers, 
progressive  global  responses  are  required  (Stiglitz,  2010;  Westbrook,  2010;  Rasmus, 
2010). However, the final outcome of this new wind of multilateralism is quite unclear.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Session 2 illustrates the main US 
public liabilities in US and tries to give both a Keynesian and a monetarist interpretation 
of the global imbalances; Session 3 examines the recent policies in the EU and in the US; 
Session 4 and 5 expose the status of the international currency and of the global order, 
and put forward some suggestions for a new global governance. Session 6 concludes the 
paper. 
2. US Debts and International Conflicts: a brief Monetarist and Keynesian views 
Today there is a growing consensus around the idea that the financial crisis of 
2007-08 is strongly connected, if not caused, by the global imbalances and the saving glut 
issues  (Skidelsky,  2009;  Obstefeld  and  Rogoff,  2009,  Bini  Smaghi  2008;  etc.).  The 
explanation which follows such a consensus is that the financial meltdown of 2007-08 is 
rooted  in  the  US’s  main  liabilities  and  debts.    Since  the  1990s,  the  amount  of  US 
government’s debt column grew impressively, reaching, on the eve of the crisis in 2006, 
more than 5 trillion dollars 
Figure 1 – US Government Debt, 1940-2010 
 
Source: United States Government   8 
Long-term data sets show that this public debt started to emerge in the 1980s, 
increased dramatically during the 1990s, and was subject only to a small reduction in 
2001; a drop which was not sufficient to offset the increasing trend.  Today the gross 
public debt is around 93% of US GDP, and it is still increasing towards the record peak 
of the IIWW period, with a public debt in 2010 almost of $9 trillion (see figure 1 above). 
The process of extreme financialization which started in US since 1980s is a parallel 
phenomenon to this indebtedness. The international power of the US dollar favored such 
indebtedness, which allows the US to consume and live above its production possibilities 
(Ivanova 2010).  
In 2010, the US economy was affected by a three separate $9 trillion debts, the 
national debt, the (non-bank) corporate debt, and the private mortgage debt. The financial 
institution’s debt was even higher, with $12 trillion.  Paralleling these trends, both the 
unfunded Medicare liability and the unfunded Social Security liability were very high 
($30 trillion and $12 trillion, respectively). Worse than that, America’s net investment 
position with respect to the rest of the world deteriorated dramatically at -$2.5 trillions 
(this is around 20% of US GDP) and the Current Account (CA) deficit reached the peak 
of $800 billion (over 6% of GDP) on the eve of the financial crisis.  This seems to be the 
most  troubling  data,  since  it  speaks  to  the  big  issues  of  a  saving  glut  and  global 
imbalances, in particular with China. 
 
Figure 2 – US Trade Deficit vs. China 
 
Source: US International Trade Commission and Economic Policy Institute   9 
Trade with China in particular is the Achilles’ heel.  China's share of the US non-
oil goods trade deficit has tripled since 2000, as shown in the figure 2 above. Even during 
the crisis, although the American CA deficit decreased from the peak of $800 billion in 
2006, the trade deficit with China has increased.  China's share of the US non-oil goods 
trade deficit jumped from 68.6% in 2008 to 80.2% in 2009. 
How all this debt, deficit and global imbalances is connected with the financial 
crisis is then simple to explain. During the process of financialization, since the 1980s, 
wages in advanced economies and particularly in US almost stagnated, and profits soared 
dramatically  (Wolff,  2010;  EuroMemorandum,  2010).  Simultaneously  inequality 
increased sharply (OECD, 2010). In order to keep consumption up, the US maneuvered 
economic policies: used cheap money which allowed bubbles in the housing sector and 
private  debt  soaring;  and  allowed  huge  amount  of  cheap  imports  from  China.  This 
eventually ended up with  huge CA deficit (IMF 2009). US financed the CA debt issuing 
US bonds which were bought in turn by Chinese, whose low level of consumption far 
compensates the American saving glut. This scenario suggests a declining hegemony of 
the US economy, because policy options seem to be restricted and the supremacy of the 
US dollar as the main international currency started to be questioned (Zhou Xiaochuan 
(2009). It underlines also new weakness of the financial system on the basis of which the 
US  economies  nowadays  seem  to  rotate  (Clelland  and  Dunaway,  2010).  When  the 
bubbles  burst,  mortgage  companies  and  lenders  fell  down  and  international  default 
correlations followed, since the securitazion of mortgages and loans was an international, 
and opaque, issue. Credit markets seized up as risk increased and expectations worsened.  
Consequentially,  the  financial  crisis  floated  in  the  real  markets  squeezing  now  also 
productive investments, economic activity and employment. 
Looking in detail at the global saving glut, in 2008 the global aggregate excess 
over investment was over $2,000 billion (IMF, 2009).  This discrepancy underlines the 
current account imbalances.  
If in the East (China and South East Asia), where there are emerging economies 
and growing middle classes with theoretically high consumption potential, people save 
too much, in the West (mainly US and UK), advanced economies have to stimulate extra-
consumption, and therefore monetary policies are enacted which authorities hope will 10
encourage spending.  At least that is what the monetarists argue (Cooper, 2007; Caballero 
et al., 2008).  In this way, the claimed money glut is just a consequence of the saving 
glut. To be more precise: a mistaken consequence. A more appropriate fiscal stimulus 
would be one based on increasing public investment.  In the West (mainly in the US and 
UK), a well-developed financial system allows for extra-consumption, mechanisms of 
future repayment, and sophisticated forms of saving with high risk.  In the East, safe and 
ordinary saving tools guarantee low returns and low risks within the framework of an 
underdeveloped financial system.  Unfortunately, high levels of saving in the East do not 
manifest in the West as high levels of investment that could compensate the lack of 
aggregate demand.  The lack of demand cannot be absorbed by the insufficient domestic 
investments. Paradoxically, net capital inflow to the US increased (see figure 3 below), 
but this did not help productive investments, but rather fed financial speculation and 
extra-consumption.  
Figure 3 – Net Capital Inflow to the US (US $ billion) 
 
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008 
In the West, one can observe the increase in demand for finance from those goods 
and  services  which  go  un-bought  because  of  high  global  saving  (Lowenstein,  2009).  
Consequently,  financing  for  consumption  and  portfolio  movement  has  increased 
massively since 2001.   11 
The main criticism monetarists put forward in opposition to the saving glut is the 
following: if there is a surplus there is a deficit, so deficit countries are as responsible as 
surplus  countries.    In  the  end,  this  is  a  matter  of  market  efficiency,  and  natural  re-
adjustments  will  occur  to  cure  temporary  imbalances.    This  is  because  monetarists 
assume  perfect  capital,  labor  and  goods  markets;  all  tending  towards  equilibrium 
tendencies (Mendoza et al., 2007; Greenspan, 2007). 
Conversely,  in  the  Keynesian  view  policies  matter;  and,  at  a  policy  level, 
countries can decide to run a surplus current account with active policies, or a deficit 
current account, with passive policies attitudes and blind trust in markets.  Exchange 
rates, export-led institutions, state involvement, government subsidies, protectionism, and 
other policies are all functional for running a surplus or a balanced budget.
4  Deficits, on 
the  other  hand,  can  be  the  consequence  of  bad  or  neutral  policies  and  attitudes.  
Furthermore, deficit countries have negative incentives to reduce their deficits by means 
such as reducing external demand, because this would bring about lower income and 
higher unemployment levels.  Contrast this to surplus countries, which are incentivized to 
increase their surplus by increasing exports, and therefore aggregate demand, since they 
would generate higher income and employment levels.
5 
Figure 4 – Global Imbalances, US and the Rest, 1995-2009 
 
Source: IMF (2010), World Economic Outlook, online database 
                                                 
4 Obviously not all countries in the world can simultaneously operate with surpluses.  Therefore, temporary 
and small deficits across the world can be sustained.  
5 Surplus countries are also incentivized to reduce surpluses by expanding domestic demand for goods, 
because they would get higher income and employment.  12
A very good example of these tendencies was the Asian crisis of 1997 (see figure 
4 above). All of the Asian economies affected in 1997 (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) turned their current account balances 
from deficit to surplus (Walter 2008).   
These  shifts  were  planned  decisions,  as  policymakers  in  those  countries  had 
learned the downfalls of persistent current account deficits. In fact, the abrupt withdrawal 
of capital from Asia by foreign investors was one of the leading causes of that crisis 
(Bello, 2010). After the crisis, and after paying their debts to the IMF, Asian economies 
turned back to mercantilist policies: personified by high saving, high surplus, and low 
consumption, in particular of imports. 
This  is  the  same  strategy  which  allowed  the  accumulation  and  the  economic 
development of the Asian tigers in the 1970s and 1980s (Ha-Joon Chang (2008) and of 
China since 2000s (see figure 5 below).  It was easier for them to operate with surpluses 
than to fall into deficit. 
Figure 5 – China and Other Emerging Economies Current Account Surpluses (% of 
World GDP) 
 
Source: IMF 2010, World Economic Outlook, online database 
Paraphrasing  Lowenstein  (2010:135),  we  can  use  an  interesting  metaphor  to 
interpret conflicting relations between East and West, in particular between China and the   13 
US. Somebody from the East, Chang, is offering goods and services for free to John in 
the West, the only expense being that John has to run a deficit.  John accepts, and now he 
works less (or is jobless).  However, he enjoys an even higher standard of living than 
before thanks to cheap goods from China and to a developed financial system in his home 
country.  He uses credit (mainly from Chang) to make purchases and eventually to make 
financial speculations and generate profits.  If he is able to make higher profits than the 
interest payments due on the debt he needed to run a deficit, he will be fine.  If the 
available financing dries up he will be in trouble, as the debt that he is responsible to pay 
tomorrow will lower the standard of living that he is enjoying today to an even lower 
level than before he entered into the Chinese deal with Chang.  
 
3. A Wrong Policy Tendency: Austerities after Fiscal Stimuli 
In  order  to  recover  from  the  crisis,  governments  in  Western  economies, 
particularly US and EU, initially put in place fiscal stimuli and bank rescue packages (see 
table A2 and A3 in the Appendix). These policies were supported by a great consensus 
among the policymakers, politicians, and academics who had begun  to look at Keynesian 
policies in a favourable way. 
Monetary policies were simultaneously manipulated by Western central banks. A 
combination of actions by the Fed, the European Central Bank (ECB), and the Bank of 
England provided a huge amount of liquidity to the private sector, and to the banking 
sector in particular, in order to avoid the crunch of the inter-lending among banks.  The 
first injections came in the summer of 2007, with the leading role going to the Fed.  The 
Fed provided more liquidity in the first quarter of 2008, first with a plan to inject $200 
billion into the economy, and then by assisting in the bail-out Bear Stearns by JP Morgan 
and the bailout of Merril Lynch by Bank of America.
6  All together, the US government 
enacted  a  $700  billion  bailout  for  the  financial  sector,  with  the  so  called  TARP  Act 
(Troubled Asset Relief Program) in October 2008
7. The ECB and the Bank of England 
                                                 
6 As illustrated in the table A3 in the Appendix, the most important banking and financial institutions of 
American capitalism were assisted during the crisis. 
7 TARP was enacted by G.W. Bush on October 3, 2008, just before Obama’s election, and allowed the 
Treasury to purchase illiquid, difficult-to-value assets from banks and other financial institutions as a first 
reaction to the subprime mortgage crisis. Posner (2009) estimates that the total amount of spending by the 
US federal government during the  period 2007-2010 for the financial crisis was of $7.2 trillion ($5.2   14 
reacted by releasing similar proportions of liquidity into their own financial markets.  
Moreover, the interest rate in the US had been reduced from 5.25 to 0.25 per cent. Similar 
action was taken in the UK. In the Eurozone, given the greatest priority of the ECB was 
to foster to price stability, the interest rate was lowered more slowly to 2.5% in 2009 and 
to 1% in 2010. In 2009, given the partial, unsuccessful results of the previous injections 
and the continuation of the crisis, the Fed undertook more drastic actions to provide more 
liquidity at a value of $700 billion (mainly buying back treasury bonds in order to inject 
liquidity into the market).  A similar plan was undertaken in November, 2010. 
Regarding fiscal policy, in the US, Obama’s fiscal stimulus, known as ARRA 
(American Recovering and Reinvestment Act) entered onto the scene in February, 2009, 
after  a  huge  debate  in  Congress.
8    The  stimulus  aims  to  promote,  in  the  Keynesian 
tradition, job creation, investment, and consumer spending during the recession.  To some 
extent  it  represents  a  breakdown  of  the  main  economic  consensus  which  favored 
spontaneous recovery, i.e., recovery driven by the market or, in the less conservative 
case, monetary policy (quantitative easy) over fiscal stimulus. 
There are at least two reasons to favor this stimulus: first, the need to prevent 
further output declines and job destruction, and second, the evidence that easy access to 
cheap money was not successful.  The Fed cut interest rates almost to zero, and one can 
envision  clearly  a  well  known  Keynesian  liquidity  trap,  where  monetary  policies  are 
ineffective. Many Keynesian economists argue that ARRA is a good step in the right 
direction, but they point out, critically, that it is far below what is needed to restore 
economic  growth  (Krugman,  2010;  Zandi,  2010)
9.  Monetarist  economists,  on  the 
contrary, worry that fiscal stimuli do not favor consumption multipliers because during 
recession individuals tend to save more and to postpone consumption (Taylor, 2010).  
Moreover, future debt needs to be repaid by taxpayers who are seeing future available 
income reduced (Giavazzi and Pagano, 1990).  
                                                                                                                                                
trillion by the Fed and $2 trillion by the Treasury Department).  It is unclear, however, how much and 
where exactly all the federal money went at the beginning of the crisis, in the desperate attempt to save 
banks and financial institutions (Westbrook, 2010). Only in December 2010, while writing, did the Fed 
agreed to partially reveal the destination and amount of liquidity injections and favorable loans during 
2007-08, while before they had appealed to national security reasons in order to hide such operations.    
8 No Republicans in the House voted for the bill, while in the Senate only three Republicans voted for it 
   15 
While  many  economists  agreed  that  a  fiscal  stimulus  was  needed  under  the 
current  recession  conditions  of  the  liquidity  trap,  others  maintained  that  fiscal  policy 
would  not  work  because  government  debt  would  use  up  savings  that  would  have 
otherwise gone to investments - what is known as a crowding out effect. (Barro, 1989).  
However,  counter-Keynesian  arguments  maintain  that  the  negative  effects  of  the 
crowding out are limited when investment has already stagnated (Romer and Bernestein, 
2010). 
The Obama measures are nominally worth $787 billion, or 2.7% of GDP. ARRA 
includes federal tax incentives, expansion of unemployment benefits and other social 
welfare provisions, and domestic spending in education, health care, and infrastructure, 
including the energy sector, which aims to promote green jobs.  Such a plan, Republicans 
and neoliberals argue, was not useful because employment did not increase.  Supporters 
of the Obama stimulus plan argue that, without the plan, unemployment would be even 
higher and recession deeper and longer, as during the 1929 Great Depression (Bartlett, 
2010). This argument seems to be convincing (Romer and Bernestein, 2010). However, I 
maintain  that  economic  recovery  will  not  come  without  further  direct  government 
packages intended to support public employment.  In fact right now, with GDP recovery 
already in process, job creation does not seem to be occurring.  At least it does not seem 
to be occurring at the necessary pace to recover 10 million of jobs (Mishel et al., 2010) 
which would be needed in order to reach the pre-crisis level of employment.  Direct 
public  employment  would  contribute  immediately  to  a  recovery  from  high 
unemployment.  A great example supporting this is the New Deal of Roosevelt, which 
created, before the US’s involvement in the WWII, around 11 million new jobs, enough 
to restore America to a pre-1929 level of employment (Wolff, 2010).  In order to do this, 
however, a new policy paradigm and a different approach is needed in the US. Such an 
approach  should  favor  a  public  culture  and  a  deeper  government  involvement  in  the 
economy.   
In  the  EU,  fiscal  stimuli  were  fragmented  and  often  uncoordinated  among 
Member states. Moreover, the EU is a supranational organization with much less power 
than the US federation and little possibility of economies of scale. Seventeen countries 
adopted the Euro and, consequently, the ECB and the Maastricht criteria which regard   16 
common monetary policies, fiscal constraints and harmonisation. Ten other countries
10 
maintain their own currency and sovereignty over their monetary policy, financial system 
and  fiscal  policies.  This  means  that  Europe  has  eleven  different  currencies.
11  This 
represents a concrete difficulty in policy coordination. However, the biggest problem 
relates to the fact that the UK is not part of the Eurozone. The UK is the second largest 
economy in the EU and the British Pound is still an internationally important currency, 
with  London  as  the  biggest  financial  centre  in  Europe  (Wahl,  2010).  Market 
capitalization in London is !1,962 trillion (2010 data), while Frankfurt and Paris have 
around  !0.900  trillion  each  in  market  capitalization  (Eurostat  2010).  When  national 
interests are on the table, EU members states, and in particular the UK, demonstrate a 
strong  opposition  to  EU  financial  regulation  and  supranational  power  (UK  Treasury 
Committee, 2010). 
So far, the total EU fiscal stimulus was around 1.5% of the total EU GDP, but not 
all the countries acted on the suggestions of the EU Commission. Spain, which was one 
of the countries hit hardest by the crisis, put in place the biggest stimulus in Europe, 
favoured by a socialist government, of 3.7% of GDP.  This plan focused for !40 billion to 
support  infrastructure  investments  and  the  automobile  industry.  France’s  plan  was 
smaller, !26 billion, which includes a boost for the construction and automobile sectors; 
moreover,  the  government  has  promised  !20  billion  for  small  businesses  and  the 
construction  industry.  Germany’s  package  includes  generous  amortization  rules  for 
companies  and  incentives  for  climate-friendly  home  renovation;  the  total  package  is 
expected to reach !82 billion, including private investments.  Italy proposes a nominal 
stimulus  for  unemployment  subsidies  and  firm  support  that  will  only  amount  to  !9 
billion. The UK has announced a temporary reduction of the VAT rate from 17.5% to 
15%. In addition, the government plans to invest !31 billion on infrastructure.  The tables 
A2 and A3 in appendix summarize these data. 
The outcomes of these stimuli were quite positive: in the second quarter of 2010, 
Germany grew at an extraordinary rate of 8.8%, and the UK at 4.8%. Similar stories, 
although of less magnitude, occurred in other European economies.  The US recovered, 
                                                 
10 Bulgaria, Czech Rep., Denmark, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Sweden, UK. 
11 The currencies of Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are pegged to the Euro    17 
too, with 1.6% growth for the same period.  Nevertheless, after the spring of 2010, policy 
consensus  switched  towards  austerity  measures.  After  the  Greek  crisis,  governments 
turned their interests, irrationally, toward budget cuts and policies of contraction (Arestis 
and Pelagidis, 2010). In the fall of 2010, the new Liberal-Conservative government in the 
UK announced an austerity plan with cuts in public expenditures and a freezing of public 
employment wages and jobs for the next three years. A similar plan was announced in the 
US by President Barack Obama in November, 2010, freezing federal pay for the next two 
years. Chancellor Merkel is proposing similar restrictive plans in Germany, and other 
continental  European  countries  are  preparing  financial  laws  very  much  focused  on 
restrictive fiscal measurements. The objective is to reduce deficits. This seems more like 
a reaction to the Greek and Irish crises, rather than a rational decision which would help 
economic recovery (Arestis and Pelagidis, 2010). 
   The Greek crisis showed how EU member states are much more concerned with 
national  issues  than  EU  integration,  in  particular  during  crisis  times.
12  The  lack  of 
coordination and financial solidarity emerged dramatically, and the issue of European 
imbalances are wrongly regarded as a problem of laziness against effort, virtuous balance 
against  bad  discipline,  Mediterranean  corruption  against  northern  European  integrity 
(Cesaratto 2010). This does not help to look at the real problem behind the deficit-surplus 
issue within the EU: a single market (with many imperfections) and a common currency 
within  a  non-Optimal  Currency  Area  (OCA)  needs  labour  coordination,  budget 
centralisation, and fiscal policy harmonisation, at the very least.
13 Beside that, the strong 
“internal devaluation” (i.e., wage moderation) that Germany carried out in the past ten 
years, along with other mercantilist policies and the cooperation of the ECB monetary 
policies,  allowed  German  exports  to  increase  dramatically  (Cesaratto,  2010).  Such 
policies were not really in the spirit of EU integration and solidarity. Consequentially the 
EU  situation  today  looks  fragmented.  One  side,  Greece  and  the  other  Mediterranean 
countries  suffer  from  the  efficiency  of  northern  Europe  firms.  Free  competition  and 
single  market  affected  the  domestic  markets  in  those  countries,  which  were  lagging 
                                                 
12 Media pointed out how an election in the small Lander of Lower Saxon in Germany during the Greek 
crisis in the Spring 2010 was enough to keep German chancellor Angela Merkel far away from an idea of 
integration and financial solidarity, which populists in Germany objected.  
13 Wray, L. Randall (July 2000). The Neo-Chartalist Approach to Money. Center for Full Employment and 
Price Stability. http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp10.html.   18 
behind in terms of competitiveness and technology at the creation of the Eurozone and 
the single market. Moreover, Maastricht criteria and stability pacts appreciated the euro 
and  contributed  to  the  declining  foreign  competitiveness  of  southern  European 
economies. On the other hand, those poorer economies in the EU can’t use monetary 
policies and exchange rate manipulation to gain competitiveness.  They can’t use state 
aids and firm subsides, nor fiscal policies which are constrained by Maastricht criteria.  
Hence, markets have to regulate imbalances despite the fact that labour mobility, single 
markets, and budget centralization are strongly limited in the EU.  It follows that surplus 
and deficit are the two malaises of the same problem: an imperfect single market and an 
imperfect  currency  union.    In  the  EU,  Germany’s  surplus  could  not  exist  without 
Greece’s deficit (and similar).  Greece should accept, within the EU rules, the German 
market super-competition, which is historically rooted and state supported, despite the 
fact that she can’t use policies to enhance her firms’ competitive advantage.  Unless these 
imbalances are covered by a central EU plan, it would not be convenient for Greece to 
accept European monetary union constraints.  
As De Long (2010), Arestis and Pelagidis (2010), and many others underlined, at 
the  global  level  surplus  countries  such  a  Germany  and  Japan  need  to  implement 
expansionary policies rather than austerity measures, spending more and taxing less.  In 
Europe, the ECB should lower  the interest rate to the Fed level (which is near zero) and 
should have a big program of buying national bonds. The Tremonti-Junker proposal of 
issuing  European  Union  Bonds  should  also  be  accepted
14.  The  European  Financial 
Stability Facility
15, which is today endowed of a fund of !700 billion, should become a 
permanent agency and should continue to buy government bonds of countries in crisis.  A 
strong institution working as a lender of last resort should be created for the EU or at 
least for the Eurozone.  The biggest European economies, such as Germany, the UK, and 
                                                 
14 Jean-Claude Juncker and Giulio Tremonti made a proposal on the financial Times for a European Union 
bond, issued by a European Debt Agency (EDA).  Each country can issue European bonds up to 40% of 
GDP.  This would create, over time, a sovereign bond market of similar size to the US one.  Initially the 
EDA would finance 50% of member states’ debt issues – but this can be raised to 100% during crises.  The 
proposal also envisions a mechanism to switch between national and European bonds for countries in 
trouble at a discount rate.  This would avoid the problem that secondary markets in many EU sovereign 
bonds are not sufficient liquid during crises.  
15 This is a temporary EU fund which was created during the Greek crisis in the Spring on 2010, providing 
an initial support of !500 billion. 19
France should expand aggregate demand to allow for more imports from Mediterranean 
economies (Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Italy), in order for them to equalize the deficit in 
the current account.  Current account deficit, in fact is, dangerously financed by German, 
British, and French banks, which buy national bonds from Mediterranean economies.  In 
turn, if those southern economies cannot repay their debts, correlation default in northern 
European banks will follow. 
4. A Need for a New International Currency 
At international level, global imbalances and the saving glut theory call into question the 
role of the US dollar as a global currency and raise the issue of a possible new global 
currency and/or governance.  
Clearly, there can be a conflict between international and domestic objectives.  As 
argued by Zhou Xiaochuan (2009), monetary authorities may fail to meet growing global 
demand for money when they try to keep inflation low at home, and conversely, they 
may create an excess of liquidity at the global level when they try to over stimulate 
domestic demand (see figure 6 below).  The current crisis, Zhou Xiaochuan says, is an 
inevitable outcome of the current institutional flaws which has the US dollar acting as a 
global currency for debts and international transactions.   
Figure 6 – US Dollar Dominance over Foreign Debts 
 
Source: Wall Street Journal   20 
Many scholars, notably in the World System field, recognize the unique position 
of US as a hegemonic borrower (Frasnk, 2005; Clelland and Dunaway 2010). The US has 
the unique and indefinite capacity to sell Treasury notes for dollars, in massive quantities 
and  practically  without  constraints,  and  became  the  key  source  of  global  liquidity. 
Obviously it has also the capacity to manufacture dollars indefinitely, in the last instance. 
US current account has been in massive deficit for the past 30 years. Therefore, every 
year, billions of dollars have been transferred from foreigners to US balance (Clelland 
and  Dunaway  2010).  Debt  could  rise  to  finance  practically  everything:  government 
expenditures,  military  operations,  private  debts,  because  the  unique  status  of  the  US 
currency ensured an international stable demand of its debt. At the same time private 
finance created tools which allowed for the recycling of the US trade deficits. In this way, 
over-consumption  in  US  was  guaranteed,  even  with  stagnant  wages  (and  profit  soar) 
since the end of the 1970s (Wolff, 2010). The opacity of interconnection of massive 
transnational securitization and speculation brought eventually at the financial implosion 
of 2007-2008, which however was a natural outcome of such an institutional framework 
(Ivanova, 2010).  
Very  interestingly  in  1965,  when  General  De  Gaulle  already  denounced  the 
“exorbitant privilege” of the international seigniorage of US $, Rueff and Hirsch (1965: 
3) wrote:  
…when a country with a key currency has a deficit in its balance of payments – that is to say 
the United States, for example – it pays the creditor country dollars which end up with its 
central bank. But the dollars are of no use in Bonn, or in Tokyo, or in Paris. The very same 
day, they are re-lent to the New York money market, so that they return to the place of origin. 
Thus the debtor country does not lose what the creditor country has gained. So the key-
currency country never feels the effect of a deficit in the balance of payments. And the main 
reason is that there is no reason whatever for the deficit to disappear, because it does not 
appear. Let me be more positive: if I had an agreement with my tailor (CHINA) that whatever 
money (IMPORTS) I pay him he returns to me the very same day as a loan, I (USA) would 
have no objection at all to ordering more suits from him (MORE IMPORTS).
16  
 
The solution, according to Zhou Xiaochuan, has to be found in an international 
currency disconnected from any single nation.  He refers explicitly to the unaccepted 
Keynesian project at Bretton Woods of an International Bank and a global currency (the 
                                                 
16 Capitals words in bracket added to the authors’ metaphor of the tailor, to emphasize the interesting 
parallel with today situation between China and USA.   21 
Bancor).  This would make exchange rate policies more effective in both objectives: 
adjusting imbalances and decreasing deficits.  He recalls an old, never fully implemented 
IMF project dating to 1969, intending to set up an international currency unit (the SDR)
17 
based on a basket of national currencies.  In these international currency projects, (the 
bancor  or  the  SDR)  the  international  monetary  authorities  should  come  from  a  wide 
consensus which exercises control and lends prestige to the new international system. 
This  should  go  beyond  the  current  IMF  framework,  which  is  based  on  institutions 
designed in North America and Western Europe, with big countries (mainly G7), having 
more power, more vetoes and more right to votes than others. A good starting point could 
be the G20 or any other wider organization (see Stiglitz 2010). 
In the Keynesian project of 1944, the International Clearing Union (ICU) was a 
global bank aimed at regulating trade between nations.  The ICU would use a global 
currency, the bancor, for all the international payments.  The bancor would have a fixed 
exchange rate against other national currencies and would measure the volume and the 
balance of trade among countries.  Every good exported would add bancors to a country's 
account, every good imported would subtract them.  Each nation would then be given 
large incentives to keep their bancor balance within an acceptable range.  If a nation had 
too much bancor due to high export levels, surplus would arise and the ICU would take a 
percentage of that surplus and put it into the Clearing Union's Reserve Fund.  This would 
encourage countries to maintain balance as close as possible to zero.  Deficit nations, on 
the other hand, would have their currency deflated to encourage other nations to buy their 
products and make imports more expensive.  A risk of inflation and a debt pressure 
would be an incentive for these countries to raise productivity and continue to strive for 
balance. 
In  regards  to  global  imbalances,  China  would  not  volunteer,  in  the  current 
institutional  framework,  to  change  from  a  quickly  growing  country  to  a  slowly 
developing one in order to save international capitalism and eliminate global imbalances.  
China  will  not  devalue  exchange  rate  and  loosen  monetary  and  fiscal  polices  at  the 
expenses of low employment and risk of inflation.  Moreover, China knows very well the 
                                                 
17 The SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to 
supplement its member countries’ official reserves.  Its value is based on a basket of four key international 
currencies, and SDRs can be exchanged for freely usable currencies.    22 
causes of the Asian crisis in 1997, and with a population of almost 1.5 billion of people, 
and  a  delicate  political  situation,  she  prefers  to  stay  on  the  safe  side.  International 
responsibilities should be passed to the richer countries, the ones which have already 
reached high living standards, unlike China. In this scenario the US economic hegemony 
would decline because its policy options would be restricted and its unlimited capability 
to finance the domestic debt would come to an end. On this line, world systems scholars 
have  already  opened  a  debate  (Wallerstein,  2008;  Wallerstein,  2009;  Clelland  and 
Dunaway, 2010). 
The crisis itself proves that a Coordinated Market Economy (CME) may do more 
to shape a new global governance and may be more appropriate to help prevent further 
crises (Pontusson 2005). The CME would guarantee a more stable path of development 
and of accumulation, mitigating the risk of boom and bust cycles illustrated by Minsky 
(1986).  Examples of CME can be found in the EU and in particular among continental 
and  Scandinavian  economies  (the  so  called  European  Social  Model),  which  combine 
interesting  and  functional  elements  of  competitive  markets  economies  such  as 
competition and private  investments, with useful market coordination systems such as 
financial regulation, public strategies of investments and Welfare and important public 
goods (Pontusson, 2005). However, when a new global governance needs to be put in 
place, global politics and power relations come into play, and this reveals that the EU’s 
political position is weaker and less reliable than the US position, which may appear, to 
the rest of the world at least, more convincing and backed by the voice of a unique and 
powerful government. 
 
5. A New Governance: Old European Tools for a Global Stable Development  
The essential truth of Keynes’s ideas is that even the most productive economy 
can fail if consumers and or investors spend too little.  At the global level, it applies to the 
current crisis as follows:  Asia, especially China, saves too much (and consumes too 
little), while the US saves and invests too little.  Furthermore, at the policy level, the 
Keynesian theory states that sound money and balanced budgets are not always wisdom 
(Krugman, 2008, Arestis, and Pelagidis, 2010).  Keynesism is not a theory which has to 
be used during a specific phase of the economic cycle. It is a general theory which, if   23 
implemented  correctly,  helps  to  prevent  crisis  and  to  maintain  a  steady  path  of 
development. 
For this reason, however, policy makers need to pay attention to two economic 
policies: aggregate demand management and labor market policy.  The first should have 
the objective of stabilizing the level of activity at full employment.  The second, which is 
connected to the first, has to ensure that labor institutions are able to guarantee adequate 
wages and permanent income mechanisms to workers in order to sustain consumption 
and  demand.  In  this  respect,  labor  flexibility  aimed  at  reducing  labor  cost  would  be 
inappropriate because it would put workers at the mercy of precarious jobs, unstable 
income, and would lower or destabilize consumption. Wage shares on income would 
decrease and consumption would then be obliged to rely on financial assistance and tools 
like credit and mortgage to be kept stable. These financial tools, however, could crash 
when workers do not have means (enough wages and jobs) to reimburse debts, and in 
turn the system could collapse. 
In this light, one could find a good explanation for the beginning of the current 
financial crisis.  The explosion of financial tools intended to sustain consumption, and the 
flexibility  of  labor  markets  in  most  of  the  advanced  economies,  two  characteristics 
introduced during the last three decades, are two sides of the same coin.  In the US, since 
the labor market is already very flexible, the main problem with regard to labor is that 
since 1975 wages have stopped increasing while productivity has increased consistently 
(Wolff, 2010). Overhauls to the financial sector must go hand in hand with a counter-
flexibility  agenda  and  wage  increases  in  order  to  make  jobs  more  safe,  income  and 
consumption more stable, to sustain aggregate demand.  
What economies need today goes beyond monetary policies, fiscal stimulus, and 
the regulation of financial markets. We also need to create a stable accumulation regime 
which allows for productive investments and the increased sharing of productivity. This 
needs to be coupled with demand management policies and state intervention in order to 
keep the system on a path of stable development and full employment.  The Welfare State 
is the necessary appendix of such a model, and it should provide for stable consumption, 
public  goods,  automatic  mechanisms  of  wage  compensation,  and  subsidies.  In  other 
words, to get out of the crisis, the solution cannot be found in temporary stimuli designed   24 
to rescue the economy from the current depression. The current financial-led model has 
been proven unstable. Therefore, any attempt to save this financial-led model by inflating 
liquidity and only temporarily raising the aggregate demand through fiscal stimulus will 
fail in the long run. What is needed is a complete restructuring of the economy, revising 
the  fundamental  institutional  forms  of  the  current  financial-led  regime  with  a  stable 
demand management of the economy.  
The new governance should address the fundamental issue of stable development, 
trying to avoid burst and bubble mechanisms, speculation, and unproductive investments.  
As I mentioned earlier, interesting parallels can be drawn between the different variations 
of  the  European  Social  Model  (French,  German,  Scandinavian)  regarding  stable 
development, as they all still have the important tools necessary, like Welfare States, 
social  policies,  and  demand  management  coupled  with  a  strongly  regulated  financial 
sector (Skidelsky, 2009).  The EU may carry out a global governance proposal based on 
its own experience. The European model is in fact, in its different variations, an example 
for  sustainable  development  in  the  long  run.  The  table  1  below  is  an  ideal  type 
representation of the kind of Coordinated Market Economy which is drawn partially from 
the European experiences during Fordism and partially from the lessons of the current 
financial crisis. 
Such a model would be a stable strategy for growth, led by three important features 
around which the other institutional forms would operate: 
1.  Secure  jobs:  increasing  wages  and  full  employment  policy  commitments  to 
sustain consumption; 
2.  Macroeconomic and industrial policies aimed at stabilizing aggregate demand, 
investments, productivity, and innovation; 






   25 
Table 1 - Post-financial Model of Accumulation and Growth 
Coordinated Market Economies  
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Following these radical changes, countries could better implement their economic 
policies, monetary ease, and fiscal stimulus, which would then produce more consistent 
results.  This  should,  however,  be  decided  within  a  complex  framework  of  political 
economy, which would take into consideration the trade-offs, domestic and international 
constraints, social cohesion, and similar issues.  The table A1 in Appendix, which would 
fit better for the political economy analysis of deficit countries, in particular the US, 
serves as a general representation of such a framework, and one could draw interesting 
observations from that. This is a synthetic classification of policy options that countries 
may put in place in order to cope with the crisis and to enact a recovery plan.  
The  European  Social  Model  ensured  better  economic  performance  in  Europe 
during the Fordist era of accumulation with respect to US. It was able to deliver better 
GDP performance for an extended period of time, at least until the end of the 1970s (see 
figure 7 below).  
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Figure 7 - GDP Growth in the EU and the US 
 
Source: Eurostat 
After that, the process of financialization began and a finance-led growth regime
took  over;  the  old  Fordist  regime  went  into  crisis.  Reasons  for  that  are  different  as 
explained  by  many  scholars  (Lipietz  1992;  Jessop  2002;  Boyer  and  Saillard  2002)
18. 
Under this model of development the EU, or more accurately the Eurozone, was able to 
outpace the US, thanks to a large public program of social expenditures, in social and 
economic  benchmarking  areas  such  as  inequality,  poverty,  public  education,  and  life 
expectancy (UNDP, 2010). The US, on the contrary, saw slightly faster GDP growth 
during the past two decades of financialization, but a concerning drop of important social 
indicators (inequality and poverty).  
However, the EU was also growing over the past twenty years (albeit at lower 
rates  than  the  US  economy),  and  not  simply  maintaining  their  social  indicators. 
                                                
18 In brief, the causes of the Fordist crisis are: a decrease in productivity, poor labor organization, the 
internationalization of problems through pressure on labor costs, and the resulting decrease in the demand. 
These  are  supply  side  causes,  national  and  international  ones,  and  exogenous  to  the  core  of  Fordist 
economic doctrine.    27 
Furthermore, the current financial crisis affected the US very badly in particular, putting 
into doubt the US model and its vaunted efficiency (Posner, 2009; Wolff, 2009). For 
these reasons I argue that the example of an European Social Model with a “fordist 
governance” able to combine demand management and welfare state, is not only able to 
produce better social performance but also socially more efficient and able to produce 
sustainable economic development in the long run. Moreover, it would help to prevent 
bubble and burst cycles and dangerous financial crises as the one we are experiencing 
now. 
On  the  contrary,  the  financialization,  since  the  end  of  the  1970s,  caused  a 
reduction of the share of the wage on the GDP among the most advanced economies (see 
figure 8 below). 
 
Figure 8 - Share of the wage over the GDP (1970-2006) 
 
Source: OECD (2010) 
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The  sharing  of  productivity  gains,  which  was  the  basis  of  the  Fordist 
compromise, came to an end, and inequality increased dramatically, bringing about a 
need,  among  workers,  for  demand  of  finance  for  consumption  (see  figure  A1  in  the 
appendix). In fact, income inequality is more marked than consumption inequality. As 
shown by figure A2 in the appendix, consumption inequality, thanks to finance, increased 
only of 6%, despite the fact that, during the same period (1980-2005), income inequality 
increases of 23%. This process, in particular in US, brought about (as shown by the figure 
9 below) a soar of profits and a dramatic increase in the finance compensation with 
respect to the rest of the economy.  
 
Figure 9 - US average compensation 
Average compensation in the financial sector 
Average compensation in the rest of the economy  
Source: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) 
In the financial sector short term results and stakeholder dividends are favored 
over long term results and productivity. The ratio between manager’s compensation and 
average wages of blue-collar workers increased steadily in the 1980s and in the 1990s. At 
the beginning of the last bubble, in 2003 it was 1 to 369 and at the eve of the financial 
crisis, in 2007, it skyrocketed to 521 thanks to bonus and compensation which do not find 
a proper justification (see figures A3 and A4 in the appendix).    29 
In turn, such a demand of finance for consumption, coupled with cheap money, 
US dollar international power, and low interest rates, sustained growth, fueled the bubble 
and nourished a doped economic growth in US. The burst of the bubble disclosed all the 
weaknesses of this paradigm and the failure of the Greenspan policies. Simultaneously, a 
lack of productive investments was a great source of the international imbalances. In fact, 
Greenspan’s loose monetary policies and the Bush administration’s budget deficit were 
facilitators of the crisis and of the imbalances (Skidelsky, 2009; Lowenstein, 2009).
19 
Therefore, a new international governance is needed in order to cure the international 
imbalances, along with a new government role able to manage the aggregate demand and 
to bring the economic system on a path of a stable development as it was during fordism. 
          
6. Conclusion 
In  this  paper  I  have  argued  that  a  new  level  of  government  involvement  and 
public policy is required in order to go out from the crisis. This should be coupled with a 
new global governance and a radical change of the international order, introducing a new 
global  currency.  In  the  US  and  the  EU  a  wide  program  of  aggregate  demand 
management,  appropriate  labour  policies,  and  public  employment  are  needed.  This 
should allow for full employment and shared productivity gains. A coordinated market 
economy, similarly to the one existing in continental Europe and Scandinavia economies, 
can be considered good examples on the base of which national solutions and global 
governance can draw interesting lessons.   
Regarding the EU, the solution can be found within the club. Since it would be 
practically impossible for poorer member states to enact mercantilist and protectionist 
policies within the context of the European Union, imbalances should be accepted within 
the  EU.  Germany  enjoys  a  better  position  since  it  historically  has  a  competitive  and 
technological advantage, and enjoys free trade and free movement within the Union at 
much less cost.  This cannot be the position of Greece, Portugal, and other Mediterranean 
countries, along with Ireland, France, and some others EU members. They could offset 
the German advantage if they could operate on the exchange rate or using monetary 
                                                 
19 Greenspan was also a great supporter of sub-prime lending and derivatives, stating, “Derivatives have 
been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn’t be taking it to those who 
are willing to and are capable of doing so” (US Senate Banking  Committee, 2003).   30 
policies.  But within the EMU this is not possible.  Moreover, since withdrawal from the 
Union  is  not  politically  practical,  the  reasonable  solution  must  be  found  in  a  central 
budget, a common fiscal policy aimed at eliminating differences, or the toleration  of 
reasonable  unbalances  within  the  EU.  In  the  end,  Germany  cannot  run  a  surplus  if 
Mediterranean member states cannot run a deficit.  In Europe, more than in the rest of the 
world, coordination is needed.  
On the global level, a lot needs to be done, at least within the new framework of 
the G20.  In particular, issues such as the contradiction and the tensions created by the US 
dollar as an international currency and the management of global imbalances need to be 
addressed. The creation of a new international currency as called for by the Bank of 
China’s governor and the institution of an international bank of payment are issues to be 
addressed.  As  argued  in  the  text,  an  international  bank  could  work  to  large  extent 
automatically, in order to deal with imbalances and crises, rather than operate on the 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 - Political economy issues and trade-offs: recovery plans and fiscal stimuli 
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Table A2 - Stimulus Packages 2007-2009 
  Germany  UK  Netherlands  Italy  France  Spain  Tot EU  US 
Bn. 
Euro 






3.3  2.2  1.4  0.6  1.3  3.7  1.5% 
(approx) 
2.7% 
IMF (2008)  
 
Table A3 - Governmental Bank Rescues, 2007-2009 
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Figure A1: Evolution of hourly real wages, US 1967-2005 
 
Top decil in the distribution (% change) 
Median decil (% change) 
Lower decil in the distribution (% change) 
 
Source: IMF (2010) 
 
Figure A2: Income and consumption inequalities (USA 1980-2006) 
 
Income inequality 
Consumption inequality (non-durable goods)  
Source: IMF (2010) 
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Figure A3: Ratio between manager’s compensation and average wages of 
blue-collar workers, US 2003-07 
 
Source: ILO (2008) 
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